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Abstract 
 
Urban defences against terrorism have traditionally been based on territorial interventions 
that sought to seal off and surveil certain public and private spaces considered targets. Lately, 
though, a much wider range of crowded and public spaces have been viewed as potential 
targets and thus have been identified as requiring additional security. This has immense 
implications for the experience of the ‘everyday’ urban landscape. Drawing on contemporary 
notions that incorporate the study of aesthetics and emotions within critical security and 
terrorism studies, this article discusses the visual impact of counter-terrorism security 
measures. It analyses the ‘transmission’ of symbolic messages, as well as the variety of ways 
in which security might be ‘received’ by various stakeholders. The analysis takes place against 
the backdrop of concern that obtrusive security measures have the capacity to radically alter 
public experiences of space and in some cases lead to (intended and unintended) exclusionary 
practices or a range of negative emotional responses. The article concludes by outlining a 
‘spectrum of visible security’ ranging between traditional obtrusive fortified approaches and 
approaches that embed security features seamlessly or even ‘invisibly’ into the urban fabric. 
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Introduction 
Recently, the UK government identified the range of risks confronting the nation in its first ever 
National Security Strategy. The Strategy noted that ‘providing security for the nation and for its citizens 
remains the most important responsibility of government’ (Cabinet Office, 2008: para. 1.1). As a result, 
recent security policy has been pursued through anticipatory, precautionary and preparatory security 
measures that aim to fuse risk-management policymaking agendas across a range of scales and 
stakeholders (Coaffee & Murakami Wood, 2006). Turning specifically to the threat of terrorism, it is 
argued that in the UK the targets of terrorist attack have been expanded to encompass a range of 
‘crowded places’, such as shopping centres, nightclubs and sports stadiums, with the express aim of 
inflicting mass casualties.1 Adopting a less overtly hierarchical response – focusing more on 
governance interaction than on governmental interventions – the task of countering the threat against 
such ‘everyday’ urban spaces is subsequently embracing and ‘responsibilizing’ a range of non-state 
and civil society actors.2  
Against this backdrop, the changing nature of the terror threat facing many Western cities and 
the subsequent responses require analysis through different frames of reference. With this in mind, 
the article is divided into two main sections. First, further context regarding the study of space, politics 
and aesthetics is provided through a discussion of the often so-called literary and aesthetic turn in the 
study of terrorism (Moore, Cerwyn, 2006). Here we are particularly concerned not only with the role 
of the urban landscape in mirroring security and counter-terror policies, but also with how such visual 
symbolism is perceived by different audiences and how emotional reactions might be further 
considered within security policy. Second, we relate these ideas to an analysis of contemporary urban 
planning and national security policy in the UK and the USA after 9/11.3 These policies, we contend, 
comprise a dual strategy: while security features at some sites are expected to be obtrusive, at other 
sites inconspicuous security is required to help such defensive measures become acceptable to the 
public. We discuss this idea of ‘acceptability’ through the development of a ‘paradox of visible 
security’. The policy implications of this are unpacked through the analysis of a continuum of visible 
security. This reflects upon recent attempts to embed counter-terrorism features into the 
contemporary urban landscape, providing tentative lessons for how future security and counter-
terrorism policy may be pursued more sensitively at the urban scale. 
Rethinking Space, Landscape and Aesthetics in the Post-9/11 
World 
In the post-9/11 era, international security studies and associated polices have increasingly embraced 
notions of human security that place people, rather than the state, at the centre of security policy 
(Krause & Williams, 1997; Paris, 2001; McDonald, 2002). One observable outcome of this shift in 
emphasis has been that the onus and responsibility for preventing and preparing for emergencies, or 
                                                          
1 This is in addition to ‘conventional’ terrorist modi operandi directed against, in most part, economic, military 
and symbolic targets, with the primary aim of inflicting disruption and winning media coverage rather than 
causing large numbers of casualties. That said, in the past, crowded places have been targeted. Now, however, 
they are perceived to be primary targets. 
2 For a more detailed elaboration of statist and non-statist approaches to security within international 
relations, see Coward (2006). 
3 As a counterpoint to this, it is clear that the type of counter-terrorist intervention varies according to context; 
see, for example, the 2007 special edition of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs (vol. 20, no. 2). 
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for enhancing security, has been increasingly transferred to other actors, such as a range of built-
environment professions, the private sector, and communities and individuals (Rose, 2000; Coaffee & 
O’Hare, 2008). Such ‘co-option’ of non-statutory actors for assistance in state security agendas 
challenges traditional security studies orthodoxy.  
At the same time, some scholars have argued for the increased consideration of aesthetics in 
relation to terrorism and security studies. This arises from the realization that ‘whilst security threats 
are becoming increasingly complex and transnational, our means of understanding and responding to 
them have remained largely unchanged’ (Bleiker, 2006: 77). The ‘turn’ towards such interpretative 
approaches can be seen as an attempt to understand how texts, art, architecture and other visual 
phenomena might reflect dominant political ideologies, and the role of particular agencies (not just 
the state) in the conduct of war and in pursuing national security (Campbell, 2003). For example, it 
has been suggested that the agents of normalizing and disciplinary power may extend beyond the 
usual suspects of social scientists, psychologists and teachers to include other professionals, such as 
urban planners.4 Similarly, theories of aesthetics reveal how art and other forms of culture can act as 
‘sites’ of complex identity construction, potentially applicable to the visual realm of security and 
violence (Moore, Cerwyn, 2006; Bleiker, 2000, 2006).  
Other approaches illuminate how emotional insights, including the fear of attack, may arise 
from policy responses to (in)security concerns. Work by Massumi (1993: viii) in the 1990s noted that 
this is by no means a new phenomenon and that, particularly after World War II, the ‘social landscape 
of fear’ has been intensified. Furthermore, Massumi argued that a low level ‘ambient’ fear has now 
infiltrated everyday life and highlights how the materiality of the body and associated emotions are 
ultimately objects of ‘technologies of fear’ or of policy responses to perceived threats. Likewise, in his 
ground-breaking essay ‘Society of Control’, Giles Deleuze (1992) argued that since the end of World 
War II a new society – the society of control – has replaced the prewar disciplinary society in which 
‘enclosures’ maintained order through the management of wages and discipline or other regulatory 
networks. In a society of control, everyday control is more pervasive but hidden, and is, according to 
Hardt & Negri (2002: 23), ‘ever more immanent to the social field [and] distributed throughout the 
brains and bodies of the citizens’. Moreover, this means that the society of control is ‘characterized 
by an intensification and generalization of the normalizing apparatuses of disciplinarity that internally 
animate our common and daily practices’.5 As Foucault (1977: 173) noted in Discipline and Punish, 
mechanisms of everyday control (of people’s movement or behaviour) are viewed as unimportant by 
citizens when the role of such instrumentation is forgotten or masked. 
Such everyday emotions, as part of a broader biopolitics,6 have been largely ignored in 
traditional scholarship in the international relations field.7 Rather, a number of authors in the 
immediate post-9/11 era have articulated how policy discourses of security and crisis have been 
written in ways that privilege the worldviews of political leaders at the expense of the experiences of 
ordinary citizens (Jackson, 2005; Croft, 2006). More specifically, Paul Saurette (2006) has questioned 
                                                          
4 See Richardson (1996: 281) for an overview of this particularly Foucauldian approach. 
5 Cited in Campbell (2005: 950). 
6  ‘Biopolitics’ is a term derived from Foucault’s work analysing a type of political control. It concerns the 
regulation and control of populations through, for example, apparatuses of security like police forces and the 
exercise of power through micromechanisms of exclusion and surveillance; see Hawkesworth (2002). 
7 See Fierke (2007) for an exception. 
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whether an understanding of new fears associated with the 9/11 attacks can be adequately 
conceptualized unless the role of emotions – for example the feeling of humiliation and the self-
perceptions it can shape – is theorized in political policy. 
More recently, some scholars have highlighted how the ‘aesthetic domains’ of literature, 
visual art, music and – critically for the present article – architecture might offer further insights into 
the symbolic and emotional impact of terrorism and the relationship between aesthetics and politics 
(Bleiker, 2006: 82; see also Moore, Cerwyn, 2006). Similarly, Martin Coward (2006: 60) has noted how, 
particularly among British international relations scholars, there exists a ‘tendency towards 
qualitative, hermeneutic inquiry (as opposed to the quantitative methods that dominate American 
political science’s analysis of global order) [that] seems well placed to investigate the conceptual 
contours of the discipline’. 
Although such interpretive approaches have, to date, been neglected by many scholars in 
international relations and political science, they have been embraced to a much larger extent within 
the social sciences. Bleiker & Hutchinson (2008: 115), for instance, make a number of ‘propositions’ 
that, they argue, might help facilitate increased synergy between these fields of study: 
1 The need to accept that research can be insightful and valid even if it engages unobservable 
phenomena, and even if the results of such inquiries can neither be measured nor validated 
empirically; 2. The importance of examining processes of representation, such as visual 
depictions of emotions and the manner in which they shape political perceptions and 
dynamics; 3. A willingness to consider alternative forms of insight, most notably those 
stemming from aesthetics sources, which, we argue, are particularly suited to capturing 
emotions. 
With specific relation to this article, we would argue that architecture – and the built form 
more generally – has the capacity to transmit a range of dominant ideologies, potentially illustrating 
how a particular society is materially inscribed into space (Harvey, 1990; Ellin, 1997). Others too argue 
that architecture and urban design have the power to order society through environmental 
determinism, with such embodied experiences often serving to in/exclude particular groups from 
certain spaces of the city (see, for example, Sennett, 1994). Drawing upon such assertions, and from 
a security perspective, the built form potentially possesses the power to condition new forms of 
subjectivity with spatial performances of identity and (in)security becoming linked to how subjects 
internalize fear. 
Moreover, other strands of work, particularly in cultural geography and architectural studies, 
portray urban landscapes as texts that can be ‘read’, revealing a range of interpretations of conflict, 
war and terrorism in a more culturally sensitive way. Drawing on postmodern and post-structural 
theories, landscape thus becomes ‘a medium in which social relations and processes are formed and 
reproduced’ (Daniels 1993: 1026). Landscapes are thus moulded by politics and may be read as texts 
that ‘reveal’ the symbolic importance of their constituent elements (Cosgrove & Daniels, 1988; Barnes 
& Duncan, 1991; Duncan, 1995). 
These and similar such ‘textual’ modes of analysis were employed to analyse the upsurge in 
urban fear in the 1990s, recognizing how the latter’s visual aesthetic came to symbolize conflict, 
violence and terror. Mike Davis’s depiction of 1990s Los Angeles as an ‘ecology of fear’ and ‘city of 
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quartz’, brutally divided into ‘fortified cells’ of affluence and ‘places of terror’, is a case in point (Davis, 
1995: 356; see also Davis, 1990, 1998). Prior studies also highlighted how symbolic markers of 
territorial conflict – counter-terrorism features or memorials to conflicts – produce highly symbolic 
(and often contested) landscapes (Jarman, 1993; Johnson, 1995). More recently, it has been proposed 
that such spatiality, specifically memorials to conflict, may function as a ‘radical space of 
communication’ as well as being a fixed moment for generating healing and/or didactic purposes 
(McKim, 2008: 83). For instance, methods of countering terrorism have been critiqued using a cultural 
landscape approach. In light of an upsurge in urban terrorism in the 1990s, one architecture critic 
asserted that urban areas are now punctuated by an ‘architecture of terror’, dominated by the need 
for increased security (Pawley, 1998). More generally, Pawley warned, new building design could 
become deliberately inconspicuous given that ‘anonymous’ design can make places less iconic and 
therefore at less risk of being attacked (Pawley, 1998; see also Coaffee, 2003; Weizman, 2007). 
Towards a Contemporary Urban Geopolitics? 
As suggested, traditional conceptions regarding conflict and terrorism have evolved to take account 
of an increasingly complex, interdependent and (we are told) potentially more threatening security 
environment. At the city scale, such trends are perhaps most apparent when the ‘meaning’ of security 
landscapes is contested by citizens. 
Today, the visible (and increasingly invisible) moulding of the built environment is conducted 
as a result of social and political priorities some of which are associated with security and insecurity. 
The ‘War on Terror’ is no exception, illustrating ‘the inseparability of war, terror and modern 
urbanism’ (Graham, 2004: 171), which have moved ‘beyond an exclusive concern for nation states, 
international relations and international terror networks’ (Graham, 2004: 170). In the light of this, 
increasing attention is now being paid to the complex and localized impact of defensive strategies 
upon social, political and economic life. 
However, Frank Möller (2007) notes that, despite a limited discursive and linguistics turn in 
critical terrorism studies, the focus has been predominantly on speech and language, with little 
attention, until recently, being paid to visual images. That said, a special edition of Security Dialogue 
in 2007 focused specifically on how visual culture intersects with ideas of militarization and 
securitization in the post-9/11 world (see Campbell & Shapiro, 2007). Here it was argued that ‘visual 
culture is implicated in new military strategies, at the same time as it enables critical practices 
contesting those military strategies’. In short, ‘there can be no doubt specific visual artefacts and 
practices have been increasingly in contention in the wake of 9/11’ (Campbell & Shapiro, 2007: 133). 
The respective articles in the 2007 volume highlighted how various elements of an increasingly visually 
dominated culture – from films (Dauphinée, 2007) and television dramas (Erickson, 2007), through to 
cartoons (Dodds, 2007), conventional art displays (Lisle, 2007) and even video games (Power, 2007) – 
have been employed by state security actors. This has been for a number of reasons: to legitimize 
their activities; to reinforce stereotypes of the terrorist as ‘other’; and to reinforce a highly visual and 
technology driven ‘watchful politics’ or ‘vigilant visualities’ to keep the homeland safe (Amoore, 2007). 
It is further proposed that such uses have attempted to create dissent regarding state security policy 
(Erickson, 2007). 
These and similar such observations have been articulated by the counter- terror response of 
many Western states post-9/11. In particular, we are interested in how the transmission and reception 
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of such impressions are projected through the insertion of overt and covert security features into the 
everyday cityscape as a method of countering emerging and anticipated terrorist modus operandi. 
The message from governments in many Western states is clear and is being disseminated widely: the 
defence of the city – of the places where people work, relax and live – is central to wider national 
security strategies. City builders – including architects, urban planners and designers – are increasingly 
expected to consume and, through practice, to rearticulate the risk-and-threat discourse in, often 
literally, ‘concrete’ forms. In essence, protective security is viewed as emblematic – a visual symbol of 
the ‘War on Terror’, or, perhaps more accurately, of defence from the ‘war on the West’. 
A Changing Perception of Threat 
UK security services have recently identified public places as being particularly at threat from 
international terrorism. In July 2007, shortly after failed car-bomb attacks against a London nightclub 
and Glasgow Airport, and two years after the July 2005 attack against London’s transport network, 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2007) noted that ‘the protection and resilience of our major 
infrastructure and crowded places requires continuous vigilance’. This reinforced prior warnings that, 
while specific targets such as embassies, military installations and key national infrastructure remain 
at high risk, a distinctive feature of current threats is that they ‘often deliberately strike at ordinary 
people going about their lives’ (H. M. Government, 2006: para. 35). As discussed earlier, such emerging 
trajectories of terrorist targeting, it was argued by the government, demand an expanded role for 
built-environment professionals, who would be encouraged to ‘design in’ protective security 
measures to new buildings, including safe areas, traffic-control measures and the use of blast-resistant 
materials.8 In a further statement, the Prime Minister’s spokesperson noted that the announcements 
would prepare ‘the public for the possibility that they may start to see some changes in the physical 
layout of buildings where people gather’ (H. M. Government, 2007). 
In essence, we are told, international terrorism may visit a high street or public places in any 
town or city. A new front has therefore been opened in the global ‘War on Terror’ – the ‘home front’ 
– with a range of actors including the general public urged to help defend places from attack, or at 
least to take measures that will mitigate the effect of a successful strike. As argued, ‘security is 
becoming more civic, urban, domestic and personal: security is coming home’ (Coaffee & Murakami 
Wood, 2006: 504; see also Graham, 2001). It is to this intersection of concepts and practice that we 
now turn in order to illuminate the often paradoxical relationship(s) between state security policy and 
public perceptions of – and the emotions arising from – the ‘secure’ city. 
The Aesthetic Paradox of Countering Terrorism 
Security features, particularly those proclaimed to prevent, deflect or mitigate a terrorist attack, are 
‘transacted’: they form part of a two-way process, being at once projected or transmitted (both 
intentionally and unintentionally) by the state and the security services, but critically also being 
consumed or received by the general public and other observers. We contend that such transactions 
– between the transmission and reception of messages – are marked by a series of paradoxes. 
‘Messages’ inherent within security features may also be somewhat contradictory or confusing, 
particularly when analysed through the prism of their ‘visibility’ – or, alternatively, ‘ invisibility’ – to 
their intended audience(s). 
                                                          
8 See comments by Gordon Brown in the UK House of Commons, HC Deb, 14 November 2007, col. 667. 
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These contradictions underline the subjective nature of interpretations of counter-terror 
interventions. For instance, secure landscapes are often constructed to convey the message to users 
that spaces are safe and impenetrable. Such strategies originate from a longer tradition of 
environmental interventions designed to help prevent crime. In the 1970s, for example, Oscar 
Newman (1972: 3) promoted ‘defensible space’: areas that were designed to deter criminal activities 
through both real and symbolic features. One element of defensible space particularly applicable to 
the counter-terrorism agenda is ‘target hardening’. This is based on the premise that physical 
protection for a place or building can make it physically more difficult to commit a crime or attack, 
theoretically deterring would-be offenders. In many instances, such features are quite obvious 
(possibly being obtrusive) or are even ‘advertised’ in order to convey the message that a place or 
building is fortified. Two messages are sent. The public is ‘told’ that a place can be used in safety, while 
would-be perpetrators are ‘told’ that their malign intent is likely to be in vain or at least will require a 
significant degree of effort. 
However, these assumptions contain a potential contradiction. While security regimes may 
attempt to ‘transmit’ feelings of safety and security through the built environment and to reassure 
the public, the ‘reception’ of these very same messages may be ‘lost in translation’. Ironically, for 
example, security features can arouse feelings of fear and anxiety by drawing attention to the fact 
that one’s safety and security is threatened. Boddy (2007: 279), for instance, highlights the difference 
between what he refers to as an ‘architecture of reassurance’ and the ‘fear theming’ of an 
‘architecture of dis-assurance’, as exemplified by the plethora of counter-terror security features 
deployed in Washington DC and New York in the wake of 9/11.  
This disassurance may be, on the one hand, intentional. Some counter-terror design features 
may in fact be a form of regulation of access and movement and a method of control over the use of 
physical spaces and buildings. Security measures such as barricading, surveillance, the imposition of 
stringent and overtly signposted rules, security announcements and access restricting security 
checkpoints could, in fact, intimidate the public. They may also promote other emotions – feelings of 
isolation, of being repressed or under constant watch or threat. For example, a recent report 
published by the UK Information Commissioner has highlighted how surveillance as a particular aspect 
of security exacerbates and institutionalizes class, race, gender, geography and citizenship (Murakami 
Wood, 2006: 3).9 As a result, people might only be able to use urban space in a particular way due to 
symbolic and psychological cues embedded in street design. 
On the other hand, unintentional filtering of activities might occur where some groups do not 
feel comfortable or welcome. As the UK government informs us, contemporary terrorism aims to 
make crowded places ‘empty’.10 As such, because of people’s real or perceived fears, there may be a 
reticence to use public spaces. In extreme circumstances, this disassurance has been likened to a form 
of agoraphobia: an anxiety or mania of place (Janz, 2008: 193–194), particularly crowded places such 
as shopping centres (Predmore et al., 2007). 
Others have also highlighted how general security infrastructure, now common in urban space 
to combat crime and antisocial behaviour, has wider implications. Illustrating this, Németh & Schmidt 
                                                          
9 See also House of Lords (2009: 8). 
10 This claim permeates presentations given at current professional training events facilitated by the UK 
National Counter-Terrorism Security Office. 
8 
 
(2007: 285) identify developments in counter-terror spatial management techniques according to 
hard (or active) control and soft (passive) control features. Hard control features include electronic 
surveillance, private security guards, and the laws and rules of conduct that can restrict actions, 
influence behaviours or impede interaction. Such ‘hardened’ features may be both pervasive and 
unsubtle, and often affect the behaviour even of those who do not aim to cause harm. Alternatively, 
interventions themselves may be open to abuse or even discriminate against certain sections of 
society or particular (racial) communities. For example, UK ‘stop and search’ laws have been criticized 
as being unfairly targeted against black and Asian people rather than white people (Ministry of Justice, 
2008). Under such circumstances, while the general populace appears defended, it is under siege both 
from the terrorist threat and, perhaps more accurately, from the governmental response to this 
threat. In contrast, ‘soft’ strategies are rather more subtle and include aesthetic and ‘streetscape’ 
features discussed later. 
To add another turn to the issue of visibility, it has also been suggested that visible security 
might in fact increase vulnerability to attack. Conspicuous security may identify some organizations as 
targets by highlighting their presence (and perceived vulnerabilities) to would-be terrorists (see, for 
example, Briggs, 2005). By extension, the need for the state to illustrate that it is taking the terrorist 
threat seriously further contributes to this paradox. For instance, the swamping of potential targets 
by armed police and in some cases military hardware11 or the ‘temporary’ manipulation of spaces 
adjacent to sites through the placement of concrete ‘Jersey’ (crash) barriers to create an exclusion 
area for potentially hostile vehicles can be used to proclaim to the public that a threat is being heeded. 
This paradox is based on the (entirely disputable) presumption that the state wants to 
transmit feelings of security. The state is, in many regards, symbolically weakened by terrorist attacks, 
and therefore counter-terrorism responses are attempts to be seen to be in control – to symbolically 
react to a threat in order to promote at least the illusion of resilience in the face of terrorism and to 
demonstrate the state’s ability to afford protection to its citizens. Elsewhere, though, security policies 
have been critiqued as being deliberate attempts to heighten fear, based on the premise that a fearful 
population is easier to control (Mythen & Walklate, 2006). Brian Massumi’s (2005) recent work on the 
USA’s colour-coded public threat-assessment system is notable. Massumi argues that the alert system 
aims to ‘calibrate the public’s anxiety’, to ‘modulate’ the fear of imminent attack and to ‘trigger’ the 
public into action. This system, noted Massumi (2005: 33), was ‘designed to make visible the 
government’s much advertised commitment to fighting the “war” on terror’.  
Elsewhere, questions have been raised as to whether the ‘rise of invisible security’ may in fact 
lead to more invasive technologies, bolstering rather than undermining the security apparatus of the 
state (Briggs, 2005)12. This is an important point of current concern. Presently, there is a concerted 
effort on the part of many Western states to establish ever more unobtrusive or ‘invisible’ security 
features in the built environment. A range of pressures have converged to create such initiatives, many 
of which have been propagated by the state itself. First, as mentioned earlier, governments believe 
                                                          
11 For example, the deployment of tanks at Heathrow Airport in February 2003. 
12 It is noted here that Briggs was discussing biometric and electronic surveillance technologies 
as being particularly invasive, but we might apply the same logic to the omnipresence of physical 
security features. 
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that the terrorist threat and the ‘War on Terror’ now have a degree of permanency, as well as a 
pervasiveness. Therefore, security interventions are increasingly required to consider concerns 
regarding public acceptability (Coaffee et al., 2008), increasing pressure to adopt design features that 
are both more aesthetically pleasing and less obtrusive (Coaffee & O’Hare, 2008). There have been 
technological and aesthetic innovations regarding the development of robust security features and an 
associated implication that professional expertise may be co-opted in order to secure the built 
environment. By consequence, security features are being increasingly ‘camouflaged’ – or covertly 
embedded within the urban landscape. These counter-terrorism features may be ‘invisible’ to the 
unaccustomed eye and do not obviously serve a counter-terrorism purpose. They include aesthetically 
landscaped barriers or street furniture and collapsible pavements. 
Such interventions can serve to combat assertions that visible security features are in fact dis-
assuring. However, in many respects, ‘invisible’ security features invert the contradictions that have 
been outlined thus far. They potentially present areas as being insecure, therefore, statutory 
institutions charged with protecting the public are rendered prone to allegations that threats are not 
being taken seriously enough. That said, it is important to reiterate that such ‘invisible’ security 
features are often ‘legible’ to those who wish to do harm to or attack an area. Research and post-
attack analysis indicate that most attacks are conducted after a period of often quite intensive ‘hostile 
reconnaissance’, when would-be attackers survey, study and analyse (reconnoitre) potential targets. 
 
. Figure 1. An Indicative Spectrum of Visible Security 
Drawing upon these differing views, we can construct a continuum that identifies the visibility 
of security as being ‘overt’, ‘stealthy’ and ‘invisible’ (Figure 1). The following sections provide brief 
practical examples of security features, outlined to help populate this indicative spectrum of visible 
security. These pose a number of questions regarding the everyday impact and legitimation of the 
aesthetic securitization of urban spaces and places. 
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Visible and Reactionary Security in the Wake of 9/11 
It has been asserted that many states, such as the USA, often disguise fear with pride, visually 
exaggerating interests of national security through the ‘emblematic’ architectures of overseas 
embassies (Boddy, 2007). It is recognized that such emotional and physical responses to safeguarding 
strategic public buildings are not unique to the current ‘War on Terror’. For instance, the symbolism 
and security of embassies has, for a long time, transmitted a message of physical defence from attack 
(Boddy, 2007). Such narrative coding of urban space became far more important after 9/11 with the 
tightening of US embassy security designs linked to less reassuring messages, legitimizing the need for 
impregnability and impermeability. Against this context, which Boddy (2007: 287) calls ‘a War on 
Terror without end’, US embassies, even in the most liberal of cities, are subject to acute target 
hardening. Visually, this emblematic and obtrusive counter-terror architecture can create emotional 
dis-assurance, particularly ‘for the neighbours’ of an embassy. 
As a case in point, mounting security concerns and public unease have led to a proposal to 
abandon the US embassy in Grosvenor Square, London. Reasons cited for relocation include the cost 
of the security retrofit in spite of the high fences, concrete barriers and crash-rated steel barriers that 
currently encircle the site (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. The US Embassy, Grosvenor Square, London (2006) 
Widely described as ‘the fortress in the square’, the existing defences of the US London 
Embassy are said to have offended the ‘aesthetic sensibilities’ of local residents, some of whom have 
moved away rather than live near a perceived terrorist target. The spacious site for the proposed new 
embassy will, in contrast, ‘provide room for the high walls and layers of security that have turned US 
embassies around the world into imposing fortresses over the past 10 years’ (Borger, 2008: 40). By 
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extension, in a study of the enhancement of security at the US embassy in Ottawa, Canada, Jason 
Burke (2008: 1) has argued that ‘planning has been co-opted in the name of security’ through the 
construction of a multilayer counter-terror defence that has had significant physical, social and 
economic impacts. These often crude security measures, it is argued, ‘detract from the aesthetic value 
of the street’ and reduce public accessibility around the site, while increasing the perceived 
vulnerability of neighbouring residences and business (Burke, 2008: 17). 
Critically, construction of emblematic security measures is not limited to fortified embassies. 
Often, in the wake of attacks, or in the face of a perceived imminent threat, security services, and even 
private institutions, have implemented initiatives and deployed security features with the principle 
goal of safeguarding particular spaces. As noted earlier, such interventions take place around sites of 
‘critical importance’ (Sternberg & Lee, 2006), including administrative buildings and places with 
iconographic or symbolic significance, as well as commercial or industrial centres. There are many 
examples of occasions when such places were targeted, as well as the sometimes rather knee-jerk 
reaction to such events. In the United States, for instance, in the wake of the 1993 New York World 
Trade Center bomb attack and the bomb attack against the Federal building in Oklahoma in April 1995, 
efforts were stepped up to protect governmental and public buildings (see also Footnote 11). Again, 
such initiatives were not without critique. Referring to the erection of barriers around the White 
House in May 1995, one journalist referred to the streetscape as ‘the architecture of paranoia’ (Brown, 
1995). 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, such interventions at potential ‘target’ sites typically took 
the form of concrete Jersey barriers and, later, steel bollards, as well as the implementation of regular 
security checks of building users. Such architectures of ‘dis-assurance’, argues Boddy, ‘exploit the fears 
rather than the hopes of Americans’, even though they are often ‘just as effective’ (Boddy, 2007: 181). 
Other cities and places were immediately subjected to similar interventions. At selected sites in 
London, ‘rings of concrete’ were constructed at key government and business sites in a drive to induce 
confidence in employees and investors (Coaffee, 2004). Some of these were later painted black in a 
(perhaps rather futile) attempt to make them more aesthetically pleasing. Such interventions, though 
crude and spatially specific, are (at least superficially) effective, in that they prohibit the penetration 
of targets through the limitation of the permeability of spaces by would-be perpetrators of attacks. 
In summary, such intervention of the security services and the military has, with time, led to 
stark forms of visible and overt protection being retrofitted within the built environment. These were 
so widespread at times that heightened security was, in effect, normalized. Again, this is not without 
justifiable critique. For instance, it has been charged that the US-wide effort to secure ‘key’ buildings 
after 9/11 has, in its rather haphazard and makeshift manifestation, prioritized the safety of building 
occupants over regard for social, economic, aesthetic or transportation considerations (Hollander & 
Whitfield, 2005: 244). It has also been contended that the ‘guns, guards, gates’ posture adopted after 
9/11 was inappropriate, owing to the way such measures ‘actually intensify and reinforce public 
perceptions of siege or vulnerability, thus heightening the sense of imminent danger and anticipation 
of attack’ (Grosskopf, 2006: 1). Initiatives in Washington DC were unpopular with visitors and planners, 
and it has been asserted that ‘the nation’s capital has become a fortress city peppered with bollards, 
bunkers, and barriers’ owing both to a lack of funding for ‘anything nicer’ and a lack of strategic 
coordination between policymakers (Benton-Short, 2007: 432). It has also been recognized that such 
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features were perhaps implemented precisely because of their visibility to the public, which could 
potentially be ‘calculated to manipulate awareness of the threat of terrorism’ (Marcuse, 2006: 921). 
With time, such interventions in many cities have been made permanent. This has led to 
further critiques surrounding the aesthetics of counter- terrorism design. As noted by Stephen Bayley 
(2007) in a recent newspaper article entitled ‘From Car Bombs to Carbuncles’, in the light of recent 
national security pronouncements in the UK regarding the permanency of counterterror features 
around key government buildings, security features must become acceptable from an aesthetic point 
of view: ‘we might live in dangerous times, but they don’t have to be ugly ones too’. 
Camouflaging Counter-Terrorist Security 
Over time, as the threats from terrorism become more acute, more pervasive, and achieve greater 
longevity (according to state assessments), and as responses become all the more widely adopted, 
significant effort has been invested to ensure that security features are installed on a more enduring 
basis. However, given the concerns and contradictions outlined thus far, there is an increasing 
reluctance to deploy the highly visible features that have been employed in the past. As Peter Marcuse 
(2006: 921) notes, 
many people object to the intrusive character of many of the manipulated responses, and 
some planners and architects have devoted themselves to the search for forms that conceal 
the anti-terror aspects of some measures: making concrete barriers with flower planters on 
top, making bollards inconspicuous, finding social uses for extreme setbacks, etc. 
Contemporary government policy promotes transparent security, ‘invisible’ to the public gaze through 
ever more subtle, softer design features. These often also serve a dual function and, for the most part, 
are not as overt or as conspicuous as other features. Such policies are reflected by the fact that, in the 
UK and elsewhere, the state, through its security apparatus, is ‘recruiting’ built-environment 
professionals to help combat terrorism (Coaffee & O’Hare, 2008). In Washington DC, to use a 
particular example, planning guidance has been issued in an attempt to create security that 
complements or even promotes vistas, open spaces, accessibility and the iconographic significance of 
the city (NCPC, n.d.: 1). The subsequent National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan (NCPC, 2004: 
A-8), entitled ‘Designing and Testing of Perimeter Security Elements’, details this tension: 
The Commission has grown concerned that these escalating threat assessments and 
potentially extreme security responses undermine its objectives for a vibrant capital city that 
showcases democratic ideals of openness and accessibility. 
In 2007, the United States Federal Emergency Management Authority (part of the Department of 
Homeland Security) outlined several core aspirations of better perimeter security design. These 
include: 
• providing an appropriate balance between the need to accommodate perimeter security for 
sensitive buildings and … the vitality of the public realm; 
• providing security in the context of streetscape enhancement and public realm beautification, rather 
than as a separate or redundant system of components whose only purpose is security; 
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• expanding the palette of elements that can gracefully provide perimeter security in a manner that 
does not clutter the public realm, while avoiding the monotony of endless lines of jersey barriers or 
bollards, which only evoke defensiveness; 
• producing a coherent strategy for deploying specific families of streetscape and security elements 
in which priority is given to achieving aesthetic continuity along streets; 
• providing perimeter security in a manner that does not impede the City’s commerce and vitality, 
excessively restrict or impede operational use of sidewalks or pedestrian and vehicular mobility, nor 
impact the health of existing trees (FEMA, 2007: 4-1/4-2; emphasis added). 
In the United Kingdom, too, recent reviews of counter-terrorist protective security have led 
to pressures to make security features more aesthetically pleasing. For example, recent public-realm 
‘streetscape’ improvements in the Government Security Zone in central London have seen 
(supposedly) more attractive and inconspicuous security features ‘designed in’ in the form of 
balustrades (see Figures 3 and 4). 
Likewise, the new Emirates Stadium in North London has actively promoted its ornamental 
counter-terrorism features. These are held up as a model of best practice for designing in counter-
terrorism features to new buildings. There, large fortified concrete letters spelling out ‘Arsenal’ have 
been deliberately situated to prevent vehicle access (see Figure 5), and have now become a favoured 
location for match-day fans to be photographed (BBC, 2007; Coaffee & Bosher, 2008). 
 
Figure 3. Security Balustrade Along Whitehall, London (January 2009) 
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Fig 4 Figure 4. Sign Regarding Whitehall Streetscape Improvements (January 2009) 
 
 
Figure 5. ‘ARSENAL’ – Ornamental Security Façade for the Emirates Stadium (July 2003) 
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Other counter-terror features may be even less obvious. For instance, expendable surfaces 
have been designed to dissipate when subjected to the pressure waves of a blast, and strengthened 
or toughened glass that can withstand even significant attacks is increasingly built into developments. 
In this respect, new design technology has become available to built-environment professionals to 
help integrate perimeter and building security less visibly and with more subtlety into the public realm. 
Another such feature, highly marketed as securing public areas in an almost invisible way, is a 
collapsible pedestrian pavement (promoted under the trademark ‘Tiger Traps’)13 that gives way under 
the weight of a vehicle, trapping it in a pit some distance from potential targets. However, such 
interventions have been reported in some press outlets (and now, of course, in academic 
publications), somewhat undermining their rather invisible premise: 
Outside the New York Mercantile Exchange, where oil and gold are traded just west of Ground 
Zero, a long row of bollards will be replaced this fall by a sidewalk punctuated with benches 
that will conceal a security device called a Tiger Trap: Just below a layer of paving stones is a 
trench filled with low-density, compressible concrete that will collapse under a heavy 
weight.14 
This form of protecting urban spaces is indicative of the increased importance of visual aesthetics in 
the ‘War on Terror’. As Trevor Boddy (2007: 291) noted, it potentially ‘represents the future of the 
hardening of public buildings and public space – soft on the outside, hard within, the iron hand inside 
the civic velvet glove’. Importantly, this particular approach also further illuminates the rise of fear 
(or, more accurately, the lack thereof) as a marketable issue. This is often exploited by the private 
sector, as was particularly obvious after 9/11. As Jennifer Light (2002: 612) noted, the fear of terrorism 
and the expansion of militarized urban space ‘reminds us that many powerful economic and political 
interests are well served by the unbridled expansion of urban fear’.  
It is also recognized that that while ‘invisible’ security brings many benefits, it also brings a 
range of challenges regarding who makes decisions and how decision makers and processes are 
monitored (Briggs, 2005: 69). In other words, concern has been raised that ‘invisible’ forms of security 
may risk becoming an uncontested element of political and public policy. 
Conclusions 
As has been reiterated throughout this article, public policy and political imperatives can be viewed in 
our streetscapes and cities at a range of spatial scales. The recent aesthetic turn in critical security and 
terrorism studies draws attention to the visual interpretation of counter-terrorism policies and their 
impact upon the use of everyday urban spaces. In short, security policy is more than words and ideas. 
Its manifestation within the built environment can transmit powerful messages, both intentionally and 
unintentionally, eliciting a range of subjective emotional responses. As such, security policy can have 
a tangible impact upon the spaces in which we live, work and socialize (and how we do so), and has 
the potential to have an immense impact on how citizens interact with each other. 
We have unpacked the range of conflicting transactions and messages that are projected. 
Urban defences can be formidable but are also foreboding – and on occasion are designed to be so. 
                                                          
13 See http://www.rogersmarvel.com/BatteryParkCityStreetscapes.html. 
14 See Moore, Martha (2006). 
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But, what is the overarching message that the state wishes to send in such circumstances? And, who 
receives it and in what fashion? Such policies are ‘authored’, predominantly by the state’s security 
services. But, clearly, their ‘readers’ may assume different meanings from those intended – or at least 
from those projected by the state. This raises questions over how different spatial and aesthetic 
arrangements of security features condition a ‘range’ of responses and the possibility for the 
(re)production of different forms of subjectivity. 
As illustrated, despite pronouncements that the main task of the state is to protect its 
population, devices and designs for safety can achieve quite the opposite effect – fearfulness, 
suspicion, paranoia, exclusion and ultimately insecurity. Such a critique is all the more powerful given 
the rise to prominence of the ethos of human security. In such instances, it is critical to note that in 
the face of attacks and the threat aura arising from them, the state’s response may in itself serve to 
terrorize the very people supposedly protected. By extension, when the acceptability and 
effectiveness of security features are considered, it must be recognized that there is a degree of 
fluidity. The source and target of threats can change over time, and so too can people’s tolerance of 
invasive security or, alternatively, their desire to feel more secure.  
In summary, invisible security, though potentially more aesthetically pleasing, and offering a 
redress to the many drawbacks of more obvious and obtrusive security interventions in the built 
environment, must itself be treated with a healthy degree of scepticism. Given the potential future 
omnipresence of ‘stealthy’ security, we must remain vigilant of the risk that citizens will provide 
passive consent to the rise to dominance of pre-emptive planning for ‘inevitable’ worst-case terrorist 
scenarios. 
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